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ABSTRACT
While there have been many variations in the experimental investigation of the public
good dilemma, nearly all have shared the assumption that public goods (e.g., clean air or
national security) are passively/automatically consumed by actors in the real world. As a
consequence, in the standard experimental design, the public good is automatically
redistributed to all group members, regardless of whether (or how much) each
contributed to its provision. Here, I suggest that the automatic distribution of benefits
design, in which each group member passively receives his or her share of the public
good, systematically under-represents many real world public goods which must be
actively consumed   in   order   to   benefit   (e.g.,   NPR,   public   parks,   clean   water,   or   ‘open  
content’  such  as  Wikipedia).  My  ‘shadow  of  consumption’ hypothesis states that actively
consumed public goods are more likely to be provided than those that are passively
consumed. Specifically, I propose that actors who anticipate the active consumption of a
public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than those who anticipate
automatic distribution or passive consumption, as is the case in the standard public goods
design. The results of a new experiment fully support my hypothesis. Actors contributed
significantly more to the public good when they anticipated an active consumption
decision than when they expected that the public good would be automatically
redistributed. These results suggest that because it does not account for how anticipated
use drives contribution, the standard public goods design might systematically
overestimate the level of free-riding that occurs in the provision of many public goods.
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Another  implication  of  the  ‘shadow  of  consumption’  hypothesis   is   that,  all  other  things  
equal, public goods that must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than
those that are passively consumed.
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PREFACE

"I like the Walrus best," said Alice, "because you see he was a little sorry for the poor
oysters." "He ate more than the Carpenter, though," said Tweedledee.
"You see he held his handkerchief in front, so that the Carpenter couldn't count how
many he took: contrariwise." "That was mean!" Alice said indignantly.
"Then I like the Carpenter best—if he didn't eat so many as the Walrus."
"But he ate as many as he could get," said Tweedledum. This was a puzzler. After a
pause, Alice began, "Well! They were both very unpleasant characters—".
Lewis  Carroll,  “Through  the  Looking-Glass,  and  what  Alice  found  there”  (1871)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the great puzzles of sociology, psychology, economics, and many other
disciplines, is why, how, and under which conditions human actors overcome conflicts of
narrow self-interest to achieve collective action - “possibly  only  the  topics  of  God,  love,  
and inner  struggle  have  received  comparable  attention.”  (Luce  and  Raiffa  1989  [1957]:1)  
Members of many groups face the problem of a pervasive tension between
individual and collective rationality (Messick and Brewer 1983): although the entire
group would benefit most from mutual cooperation and the provision of a collective
good, every actor is also tempted to free ride on the costly contributions of his/her fellow
group members (Dawes 1980). However, if nobody contributes, the good will not be
provided, nobody benefits and all will be worse off. The free rider problem (Olson 1965)
jeopardizes collective action and remains a fundamental challenge for humans all around
the globe (UNDP 1999; van Lange 2008.)
And   “[y]et,   people   do   overcome   the   collective   action   problem;;   society   is  
possible”1 (Willer 2009:23). Proposed solutions to the puzzle of how Public Goods2 are
provided have come from sociology (Willer 2009), political science (Ostrom 1990),
social psychology (van Vugt 2009), economics (Gintis et al. 2005), and many other fields

1

“Let  me  start  with  a  provocative  statement.  You  would not be reading this article if it were not for some of our
ancestors  learning  how  to  undertake  collective  action  to  solve  social  dilemmas”  (Ostrom  1998:1).  
2

The focus of this paper is the Dilemma of Public Goods. For a comparison between public good and Common
Resource Pool Dilemmas see Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006), Ostrom (2003) or Sell and Son (1997).
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(overviews in Hardin 1982; Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1996; Ledyard 1995;
Oliver 1993; Ostrom 1998; Udehn 1993; van Lange et al. 2013).3 Despite many
variations on the standard design in public goods experiments, nearly all of them have
shared a fundamental feature: the public good is automatically redistributed to all group
members, regardless of whether or how much each contributed to its provision.
Here, I suggest that the automatic distribution of benefits design, in which each
group member passively consumes his or her share of the public good, systematically
overestimates the level of free-riding that occurs in many real world groups. That is,
while some public goods (e.g., clean air, national security) are passively consumed, many
others   (e.g.,   public   radio   or   television,   public   parks   and   gardens,   clean   water,   or   ‘open  
content’   materials   such   as   Wikipedia)   must   be   actively   consumed:   although   no   one  
person can be excluded, each must make a decision about whether (or how often) to tune
in to NPR, walk or picnic in a park, or use Wikipedia.4
I introduce the shadow of consumption hypothesis to explain why public goods
that must be actively consumed are more likely to be provided than those that are
passively consumed. Specifically, I argue that an actor who anticipates the active
consumption of a public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than an
actor who anticipates automatic distribution or passive consumption, as is the case in the
standard public goods design.

3

More recent approaches to the collective action problem include descriptive norms of cooperation (Cialdini
2006; Irwin and Simpson 2013), peer sanctioning (Fehr and Gaechter 2002; Eriksson et al. 2013), the legitimacy
and centrality of sanctioning authorities (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011), hierarchical models of organization
(Halevy et al. 2011), status differentiation within groups (Willer 2009; Simpson et al. 2012), and moral
judgments of and by group members (Simpson et al. 2013).
4

Note that the present research is mainly concerned with the way benefits of public goods are consumed
(passively vs. actively), rather than the extent to which these benefits are shared equally or not.
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I claim that the passive consumption of many Public Goods resembles inaction/omission,
while active consumption of many other Public Goods is analogous to action/commission
(de Scioli et al. 2011).
I build upon social psychological research which has shown that commissions are
attributed higher levels of responsibility and intentionality, elicit more affective reactions,
and are subject to much harsher moral judgments and scrutiny than omissions, even if
they lead to the very same outcomes (Baron and Ritov 2004; de Scioli et al. 2011;
Kordes-de Vaal 1996; Malle and Bennet 2002; Spranca et al. 1991; Zeelenberg et al.
2000). I thus suggest that in active public good settings (where the benefit must be
actively consumed) self-serving actors will not only more likely be detected and
identified as free riders than in passive settings (where the benefit is automatically
received), but will also elicit more negative emotions and moral judgments of other group
members. I conclude that free riding in active public good settings is less likely to occur
than in passive settings and predict significantly higher cooperation rates for the actively
consumed public goods.
I tested this and other hypotheses against the results of a first experimental study.
The   results   fully   support   my   main   ‘shadow   of   consumption’   hypothesis:   actors  
contributed significantly more to the public good when they anticipated an active
consumption decision than when they expected that the public good would be
automatically redistributed. My thesis is organized in the following way. First, I will give
a brief overview of the Public Good Dilemma. I identify  ‘passive  consumption’  of  Public  
Goods as an implicit, yet ubiquitous feature of all experimental studies of Public Goods.
After introducing active consumption as a distinctly different consumption type of public
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goods, I outline my theoretical argument at greater detail, and derive hypotheses. Finally,
I present the results of a first experimental test using an active consumption design,
discuss several possible implications of my research, and conclude with suggestions for
future work.

4

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1 PUBLIC GOODS AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS
The provision of Public Goods always contains Social Dilemmas. These dilemmas are
brought about by an interplay of certain structural features all Public Goods share
(infeasability of exclusion and jointness of supply/consumption) as well as the
generalized assumption of narrowly rational/self-interested actors. Once created, all
actors   have   equal   access   to   a   public   good’s   resources   and   cannot   be   excluded   from  
equally  benefitting  “regardless  of  whether  they  have  helped  provide  the  good”  (Kollock  
1998:188).
For example, even though some people might have not donated to National Public
Radio (NPR) they cannot be excluded from benefitting from its programming. Likewise,
“if   the   law   says   that wage rates in a factory must be uniform for each job category,
nonunion workers cannot easily be excluded from enjoying the benefits of unionnegotiated  wage  increases.”  (Hardin  1982:19-20) Furthermore, the benefit of some actors
does not preclude the benefitting  of  others:  “Jointness  means  that  the  utility  one  person  
derives   from   a   good   does   not   diminish   as   a   result   of   its   use   by   other   people”   (Udehn  
1993:241). Hundreds of thousands having tuned in to NPR will not prohibit others others
from listening to the station. Likewise, once a wage increase has been successfully
negotiated  by  a  union,  “it  benefits  all  the  relevant  workers  so  that  one  worker’s  receipt  of  
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the  higher  rate  does  not  reduce  the  rate  available  to  others.”  5 (Hardin 1982:19)
One  of  rational  choice  theory’s  main  axioms  states  that  actors  will  always  act  to  
maximize their expected utility by maximizing own payoffs while minimizing personal
losses (Luce and Raiffa 1989[1957]; von Neumann and Morgenstern 2004[1944]).
“Though  all  of  the  members  of  the  group  therefore  have  a  common  interest  in  obtaining  
this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that
collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily
would   get   any   benefit   provided   whether   he   had   borne   part   of   the   cost   or   not.”   (Olson  
1965:21)
The resulting social dilemma, also known as the Public Good Dilemma, has
commonly been framed as a N-Person Prisoner’s   Dilemma   (Taylor   1987):   Although  
universal cooperation is the pareto-optimal (but unstable) solution for the entire
collective, games are predicted to approach the pareto-inferior (yet stable)6 NashEquilibrium (Nash 1957) of universal defection because each actor gains the maximum
payoff  by  defecting  and  “free  riding”  (Olson  1965:76)  on  the  cooperation  of  all  others.  
Hence, “a   rational   egoist   in   a   public   good   game   (...)   should   not   in   any   way   be  
affected by a belief regarding the contribution levels of others. The dominant strategy is
zero  contribution,   no  matter  what   others  do.”  (Ostrom   2000:140)  This   strong free rider

5

“Few,   if   any,   joint   consumption   goods   are   perfectly   nonsubtractible.   The   use   and   enjoyment   of   gravity   as   a  
force which firmly keeps out feet on the ground may illustrate the case of perfect nonsubtractibility, but most
joint consumption goods are instead subject to partial subtractibility. At certain thresholds of supply, one
person's   use   of   a   good   subtracts   in   part   from   its   use   and   enjoyment   by   others.   Congestion   begins   to   occur.”  
(Ostrom   and   Ostrom   1999:77)   “But since very few of the goals or goods that groups seek can accurately be
described  as  pure  public  goods”  (Hardin  1982:19),  the  central  focus  of  the  dilemma  research  tends  to  be  on  goods  
where exclusion is not feasible (Olson 1965), rather than those with ideal or perfect jointness (Samuelson 1954).
6

The   solution   is   ‘stable’   because   defection   is   the   dominant   strategy   for   every   actor   in   any   situation.   “One  
strategy is said to dominate another if the first strategy always yields a payoff at least as good and sometimes
better  than  the  second,  no  matter  what  any  other  player  does.”  (Hardin  1982:24)
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hypothesis7 (Brubaker 1975) universally predicts failure of collective action: no good will
be  provided,  nobody  benefits,  and  “the  individual is worse off than if everyone (himself
included)  contributed.”  (Marwell  and  Ames  1979:1338)  
Although the provision of public goods poses a conflict between individual and
collective interests (Messick and Brewer 1983), a large literature suggests that groups are
able to overcome this tension to a much greater extent than is predicted by the rationally
self-interested actor model (Marwell and Ames 1979, 1981; Ledyard 1995; Ostrom 1990,
1998.)
2.2 THE FEATURE OF PASSIVE CONSUMPTION
Social scientists have up to now frequently assumed that actors consume Public Goods
passively: “where  a  good  is  characterized  by  jointness  of  consumption  and  non-exclusion,
a user is generally unable to exercise an option and has little choice whether or not to
consume”   (Ostrom   and   Ostrom   1999:79). This makes intuitive sense for many Public
Goods such as national security or clean air: one can neither be excluded by others, nor
can one voluntarily exclude oneself from enjoying the benefits of peace or clean air.
“As we will see, there are as many variations in procedures and treatments [of
public  good  experiments]  as  there  are  research  groups”  (Ledyard  1995:2);;  yet,  almost  all  
experiments   share   the   feature   of   passive   consumption.   Modeled   as   “give-some
dilemmas”  (Dawes 1980), games are designed to replicate the basic features of real world
social dilemmas in the laboratory by modeling a structural conflict between individual
and collective rationality. Most commonly, this is achieved by establishing fixed payoff
preferences resembling a N-Person  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  where  for  each  actor  DC  >  CC  >  
7

Free riding is not always the same as defection since in case of universal defection (DD is predicted) there is
no one on which to free-ride.
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DD > CD.
In  the  basic  or  ‘standard  version’  of  the  public  good  game8 each actor i in a group
of n people is asked how much (if any) xi of an initial monetary endowment ℇ in his/her
“private  account”  he  or  she  would  like  to  contribute  to  a  “group/public  account”.  While  
any amount an actor keeps in his/her private account (ℇ - xi) initially belongs to him/her,
all (if any) contributions to the group account

n
i=1

∑  (xi) get multiplied by a factor α (with

1 < α  <  n)  and are then equally divided by n. Finally, each actor i’s personal share from
the group account is “paid to i based on the choices of x1, ... , xn .”   9 (Ledyard 1995:9,
emphasis mine.) Said differently, in the standard model each actor automatically receives
his/her equal personal share of the group account or public good: passive consumption is
a ubiquitous feature of public goods experiments.
At this point of my analysis, an important distinction must be made. Although the
design presented above is the most widely used in public good studies, not all researchers
have assumed that each actor will benefit equally from the provision of a collective good
(see Hardin 1982:67-90). Already Olson (1965) noted that certain   “privileged”  
actors/groups might benefit more from certain public goods than others. Hence, many
8

This is what Ledyard  (1995:8)  refers  to  as  “simple  environments  with  public  goods.”

9

Imagine a five person public good dilemma game with initial endowments of 10 tokens per actor and α=2.
Each actor profits maximally in the case of his/her defection and the maximum cooperation of all other group
members (DC). Here, the returned public good share for each actor would equal 16 tokens (10 tokens*4*2/5).
That is to say, the final outcome for the defector would be 26 tokens (10 in private account + 16 public good
share), and for each cooperator 16 tokens (0 in private account + 16 public good share). If everyone contributes
the entire endowment to the public account (CC), each actor will receive a personal share of 20 tokens, that is to
say, the initial endowment will have been doubled (public good share: 10 tokens*5*2/5=20 tokens). However, if
all actors keep their entire endowments without contributing anything (DD), the good will not be created and
each actor will be left with his/her initial endowment of 10 tokens (public good share: 0 tokens*5*2/5=0 tokens).
The worst case scenario for ego is ending up as the only full contributor in a group of free riders. CD is simply
the reverse case of DC (i.e., ego ends up with the simple public good share of 16 tokens, while all others finish
with an additional 10 tokens kept in their private accounts (=26 tokens).
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past public good studies have modeled heterogeneous groups via asymmetrical
endowments/payoff functions among actors (e.g. Isaac et al. 1985; Marwell and Ames
1981; Oliver et al. 1985; van Dijk and Grodzka 1992; van Dijk and Wilke 1993).
Importantly, however, all these studies still shared the feature of passive consumption.
That is to say, although some actors benefitted at different rates than others, benefitting
itself occurred exclusively in a passive way via automatic distribution of the Public Good.
Thus, for the remainder, my research will be solely concerned with the type of
public good consumption (i.e., the way one benefits from a good: passively or actively),
and not the symmetry of public good consumption (e.g., whether every actor benefits at
equal rates or not.) To conlcude, passive consumption is a ubiquitous feature of public
goods experiments. In the chaper to follow, I will introduce a new consumption type:
active consumption.

9

CHAPTER 3
THEORY

3.1 INTRODUCING ACTIVE CONSUMPTION
In contrast to passively, or automatically, consumed public goods, those which must be
actively consumed provide actors only with a consumption potential. That is to say,
although every actor has access to such a good (exclusion is infeasible), whether and how
much an actor actually receives of his or her share depends on a (more or less) active
consumption decision. Real world examples of public goods that, once produced, must be
actively   consumed   abound:   NPR,   public   parks   or   gardens,   public   transportation,   “open  
content”  such  as  Wikipedia,  public  supply  of  clean  water,  health  care  revolutions  such  as  
the Polio vaccination in 1950/60s America, or civil rights such as the right to vote or
marry for formerly excluded groups.
For an illustration, imagine a Public Good such as NPR. Though no actor can be
excluded   from   benefitting   from   NPR’s   programming,   or   diminish   other   actors’   utilities
when listening, no actor consumes the public good passively (i.e., by doing nothing), but
only by active consumption (i.e., by deciding whether and how often to listen to NPR).
Likewise, to take up the example of gay marriage, the provision of the public good (i..e,
the right to marry with all related civil benefits) does not result in every gay or lesbian
couple actually using these benefits. To benefit from the right (which is, as said earlier,
an available potential), one still needs to make an active decision to get married. A
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similar case can be made for a city which provides its citizens with the collective good of
clean water (note that here the public good is water quality, not the water itself). Unlike
clean air, the benefits from clean water for any person can only be derived via active
consumption.
At this point of our investigation, a central question must be posed: given the
identified qualitative differences between actively and passively consumed public goods,
what will be the implications for the theory of public goods (which up to now has only
treated passive consumption)? I will proceed to the main argument of my thesis: public
goods which must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than those
passively consumed. Because of that, I will claim that past experiments have exaggerated
the extent to which public goods will be underprovided.

3.2 THE SHADOW OF CONSUMPTION10
Figure 3.1 illustrates how settings of passive consumption treat Stage II (by definition)
identical to Stage III (i.e., the share of a public good is necessarily the amount passively
consumed), while in settings of active consumption the two stages are distinct: here,
Stage II is framed only as a consumption potential which is subject to a distinct active
consumption choice in the subsequent stage. My main argument states that actors who
are anticipating an active consumption of a public good will contribute significantly
more to the production of a public good than actors who are anticipating passive
consumption.

10

The scope conditions of my initial theoretical model encompass typical public good scenarios in which the
production of a Public Good is jeopardized by a tension between individual and collective rationality (see
Appendix A).
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Basic model
Passive Consumption

Stage I

New model
Active Consumption

Behavioral options

TYPE (Example)

Behavioral options

CHOICE (ACTIVE)

CONTRIBUTION

CHOICE (ACTIVE)

(Contributing to group defense)

Stage II

NO CHOICE (PASSIVE)

(Donating to NPR)

SHARE OF BENEFIT NO CHOICE (PASSIVE)

(Successful group defense)

Stage III

(NPR continues to broadcast)

CONSUMPTION

NO CHOICE (PASSIVE)

(Benefitting from group defense)

CHOICE (ACTIVE)
(Enjoying  NPR’s  program)

Figure 3.1 Behavioral options in two models: passive vs. active consumption.
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I claim that passive consumption of a public good is analogous to inaction, or
omission, while active consumption is analogous to action, or commission. I build on
social psychological research which has shown that actions/commissions are generally
attributed higher levels of responsibility and intentionality, are more harshly judged, and
are generally more visible and salient (both for actors and observers) than
inactions/omissions. Specifically, it has been found that commissions elicit higher rates
of affective reactions in humans than omissions (Zeelenberg et al. 2000). This is based on
attributions

of

more

responsibility/intentionality

for

actions/commissions

than

inactions/omissions (e.g. Kordes-de Vaal 1996). Moreover, actions/commissions that lead
to a positive outcome are praised significantly more than inactions/omission leading to
the same positive outcome. Similar effects hold for negative outcomes: here, too, actions
are blamed significantly more than inactions, even if the two lead to the same outcome
(Baron and Ritov 1994; Malle and Bennett 2002).
A recent study by de Scioli et al. (2011) found that actors who obtained a morally
questionable outcome via omission were judged less severely by observers than those
who obtained the same outcome via commission. More importantly, the authors reported
that when people were able to realize self-serving – and other-harming outcomes either
through  omission  or  commission,  they  tended  to  opt  for  omission:  “These  results  provide  
evidence for a specific causal relationship in which reduced condemnation of omissions
causes  people  to  choose  omissions  as  a  strategic  response”  (de  Scioli  et  al.  2011:445).  
The dichotomy between omission vs. commission parallels settings of passive vs.
active consumption of Public Goods. I thus suggest that free riders in the former benefit
from more behavioral leeway and ambiguity than the latter. Said differently, while in the
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passive model self-interested actors only need to withhold contributions in the first stage
in order to free ride (and then benefit passively), narrowly rational actors in the active
model need to make an additional active choice in the third stage. Besides making this
choice actively (signaling intentionality of and responsibility for the act), free riders also
need to consume the maximum in order to benefit most.
I claim that two distinctly intentional actions in settings of active consumption
significantly increase the likelihood of being morally condemned as a free rider based on
i)  lower  behavioral  ambiguity,  ii)  heightened  salience  of  one’s  actions,  and  iii)  heightened  
sensitivity for fairness and justice (compared to passive settings where consumption
happens automatically.) Further reasons to expect that free-riders on public goods that
must be actively consumed will be viewed more negatively come from a study by Delton
et al. (2012). Across several situational vignettes the authors tested different free riderdetection   models   and   found   that   “failure   to   contribute   is   not sufficient. Failure to
contribute can occur by intention or accident, but the adaptive threat is posed by those
who  are  motivated  to  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of  cooperators.”  (1252,  emphasis
mine)
They   concluded   that   “the   human   mind does not equate free rides with undercontribution, nor does it lump free riders into a general category that contains all moral
violators. Instead, (...) the mind classifies individuals as free riders only when their
behavior indicates they have a psychological design or calibration that causes them to
consume benefits while withholding contributions (1267, emphasis mine). This is the
strategy narrowly rational actors should pursue in settings of active consumption (i.e.,
zero contribution + max. consumption).
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However, as emphasized earlier, active consumption settings allow for much a
greater   visibility   and   attribution   of   intentionality   of   one’s   actions   because   of   two  
decisions which are made actively: contribution and consumption (compared to only
active contribution in passive settings. To conclude, I claim that free riding in the active
setting will be judged more unfairly than in the passive setting, even when the exact same
self-serving outcome is realized.

Hypothesis 1: Low contributors who actively consume the maximum personal available
amounts of a public good will be judged as acting less fair than low contributors who
passively consume the same amount of a public good.

If we can infer that the two types of consumption (passive vs. active) elicit significantly
different   attributions   of   free   riders’   fairness   and   morality   by   observers, we should also
expect that actors themselves will be aware of that and make strategic choices in order to
minimize   others’   negative   judgments.   “We   infer   that the preference for omission is
strategic: People choose omissions to avoid third-party  condemnation  and  punishment.”  
(de Scioli et al. 2012:445) I hypothesize a similar strategic behavior when actors are able
to determine the type of consumption setting (active vs. passive).
In the following hypothesis, I define a sucker as one who contributes a lot while
his or her fellow group members contribute very little. I define a free-rider as someone
who contributes very little while his fellow group members contribute a lot. I argue that
suckers  will  prefer  active  consumption  in   order  to   bring  others’  moral   transgressions  to  
15

attention, and to increase the likelihood of fair consumption. That is to say, suckers will
hope that low contributors will consume less than the maximum available benefit. Freeriders, on the other hand, will prefer passive consumption of public goods, in order to
mitigate  the  severity  of  others’  judgments.  

Hypothesis 2: Suckers will tend to prefer a public good that is actively consumed
whereas free-riders will tend to prefer a public good that is passively consumed.

My final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Contributions will be significantly higher in settings where Public Goods
are actively consumed compared to settings where they are consumed passively.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS

Design and Participants
The experiment was a randomized two condition within-subjects design which exposed
all participants to both types of consumption (active vs. passive). The main betweensubjects factor was order of exposure (active consumption first vs. passive consumption
first). Participants were recruited from a large public university in the southeastern US. A
total of 59 participants (66% female) took part in the study.

Procedure
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were individually seated in separate isolation
rooms to rule out communication among each other. Participants were informed that they
would never meet other participants and that their identity would not be revealed at any
time during, or after the study. Participants were informed that all decisions would be
made via networked computers. Instructions informed them that they would work with
four other participants on a group task, and that their final earnings would be determined
by   their   own   and   others’   decisions.   In   reality,   participants   interacted   with   simulated  
others whose behavior was preprogrammed.
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Public Good Dilemma – Contribution Part
Participants read the contribution instructions for a typical Give-some Dilemma (see, e.g.,
Willer   2009).   Subjects   were   told   that   each   player   had   a   “private   account”   which   was  
endowed with 10 tokens. Tokens translated into a distinct monetary value, unknown to
participants.  Anything  in  each  actor’s  private  account  was  his/hers.  Participants were then
informed  that  there  was  a  second  account  called  “public  account”  and  that  they  would  be  
asked to make a decision about how much of their private endowment to contribute to the
public account. Each token was displayed as a small money bag, and had to be
transferred separately via drag-and-drop. Finally, participants were told that all tokens
contributed to the public account would be doubled by the computer.

Manipulation of Active vs. Passive Consumption.
I now introduce the main manipulation (passive vs. active consumption).
A. Participants in the control condition (passive first) continued to read the (passive)
consumption instructions of typical Public Good Games. Players were informed that the
doubled public account would be divided equally among all five group members. That is
to say, each participant was informed that he or she would receive 1/5 (20%) of tokens
from the doubled public account, regardless of how much she had contributed.
B. Participants in the treatment condition (active first) continued to read the (active)
consumption instructions for the modified Public Good Game.11 Players were informed

11

To the best of my knowledge, this design was introduced by Parks and Stone (2010). However, while the
authors’  main dependent variable was the expulsion of group members who all made active consumption
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that once the public account was doubled, every member of the group was allowed to
take up to 1/5 (20%) of tokens from the group account, regardless of how much she had
contributed.12 Specifically, actors had to transfer the tokens they wanted to consume from
the public into their private accounts. Each token was displayed as a little money bag, and
had to be transferred separately via drag-and-drop. This measure was chosen to increase
the   salience   (and   manipulation)   of   “active   consumption”,   i.e.,   consumption   involved  
effort, unlike typing a choice into a text-box. In order to elicit anticipation of maximum
consumption   participants   were   told   that   any   tokens   not   transferred   to   one’s   private  
account in one round would go away (i.e., they would not be transferred to the next
round). This helped ensure that, in both conditions, participants would always anticipate
maximum consumption.
The two conditions posed exactly the same social dilemma. Each actor knew that
everyone would benefit most in case all contributed their entire endowments (collective
rationality). Similarly, I made sure to underscore that each actor in the passive
consumption setting would always consume exactly 1/5 of the group account, while
those in the active setting would have the potential to consume up to exactly 1/5 of the
group account, regardless of individual contributions. Participants expected to play
several rounds of the same game without being told how many.
Furthermore,   the   instructions   stated   that   their   and   all   others’   choices   would   be  
decisions, the main dependent variable in the present research is the amount of contributions to a public good in
active vs. passive settings.
12

Of course an actor can only contribute anything from zero up to his/her total endowment in the contribution
phase, and likewise actively consume only anything from zero up to his/her total personal share of the public
good (=20%) in the second phase. Thus, the public good remains non-rival. For example, if in a group of 5, all
members contribute all 10 tokens, the doubled group account would consist of (5*10)*2=100 tokens. This
amount will then be divided equally among all: 100 tokens / 5 = 20 tokens. However, while the basic model
would automatically allocate all 20 tokens to each participant, the new design gives participants the choice to
consume anything from 0 up to the maximum of (here) 20 tokens.
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publicly displayed after each round on the computer screens. Participants were told that
they  would  only  be  distinguishable  from  each  other  via  the  random  assignment  of  “group  
member   IDs”.   Finally,   a   quiz   was   administered   in   both   conditions   to   make   sure  
participants had understood the basic features of the social dilemma, and to further
reinforce the manipulations.

First and Second Decisions [Test of Hypothesis 3]
Before   the   beginning   of   the   first   round,   actors   were   allegedly   “randomly   assigned”   a  
group member ID by the computer. In reality, in the first two rounds participants in both
conditions were always assigned to be member #2. Participants then went on to make
active contribution decisions. Across conditions, participants were given the same
simulated   feedback   of   “alters’”   contribution   decisions, while their own choices were
displayed, under their group member ID (see Appendix B). However, while in the passive
consumption condition the feedback already contained the consumption output (no
choice), participants in the active consumption condition went on to the subsequent
consumption choice.
After that, a final feedback table was presented, now showing both the real
consumption  choice  for  ego,  while  presenting  false  feedback  about  others’  consumption  
decisions. Because consumption below the maximum was non-rational (i..e, not
consumed tokens could not be consumed in subsequent rounds), each simulated alter
always consumed the maximum possible. In round two the basic procedure of round one
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was repeated. Upon completion of the second round, subjects were told that they would
now be working on a different group task with a different group of four others.
Within Manipulations – Consumption Part (second order)
I then introduced the manipulation by simply switching type of consumption. That is to
say, subjects who started in the passive consumption condition were introduced to the
active consumption manipulation, and vice versa. Except for subjects anticipating to
work with a different group of people for the following rounds, everything else remained
constant (i.e., anticipation of several rounds, etc.). Again, a quiz was administered
checking for the understanding of the altered procedures.

Third and Fourth Decisions
Before the beginning of the third round, participants   were   again   allegedly   “randomly
assigned”  a  group  member  ID  by  the  computer.  In  reality,  in  the  third  and  fourth  round  
participants in both conditions were always assigned to be member #5. Participants then
went on to make active contribution decisions. Members across conditions were given the
same   simulated   feedback   of   “alters’”   contribution   decisions,   while   their   own   choices  
were displayed, under their group member ID. The basic procedure from round one and
two was repeated. That is, the behavioral component of the study ended with the fourth
public goods game.
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Free Rider Questionnaire [Test of Hypothesis 1]
After the behavioral part of the study, participants were asked to compare and rank two
members   of   two   different   “hypothetical   groups”   on   a   single   dimension:   fairness.   The  
hypothetical scenario I constructed consisted of two five person groups. The two groups
were distinguished by whether the type of public good they produced was actively or
passively consumed. In both groups, the focal member contributed 2 tokens (out of 10) to
the group fund. The group member in the active consumption setting then consumed the
maximum of 12 tokens. The group member in the passive setting received the same
amount   automatically.   Participants   were   then   asked   to   rate   “which   person   acted   more  
unfairly”  on  a  7-Item Likert Scale (see Appendix C.)

Strategic Choice Questionnaire [Test of Hypothesis 2]
In a final task, participants were again presented with hypothetical feedback tables
showing the ostensive contributions of a single group of five actors to the group fund.
Participants were asked to imagine being a specific group member (group member #5). In
one scenario, group member #5 was a sucker (i.e., the sole high contributor (10 tokens) in
a group of low contributors [all 3 tokens]), while in a second scenario group member #5
was a free-rider (i..e, the sole low contributor (3 tokens) in a group of high contributors
[all 10 tokens]). This was the main manipulation (ego was the sucker vs. the free rider in
the contribution phase). Participants were exposed to both scenarios in random order. For
each scenario, they were then asked whether they would prefer the public good to be of
the actively or passively consumed type:
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Version X: After group fund is doubled, every member automatically gets added 1/5 of
tokens from the group account to his/her private account by the computer.
Version Y: After group fund is doubled, every member can take any amount from 0 up to
1/5  of  tokens  from  the  group  account  and  transfer  to  his/her  private  account.”
While version X resembled the passive consumption setting (automatic reception of
tokens from the group account), version Y resembled the active consumption setting
(active consumption of tokens from the group account).
This concluded the study. Subjects were then all paid the same amount ($8), checked for
suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. The entire study lasted less than
45 minutes.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

Hypothesis 1
A one-sample t-test of the fairness ranking between a free rider in a passive and an active
setting  yielded  a  mean  of  3.17  (SD  =  1.3),  significantly  below  the  midpoint  (‘both  actors  
equally   unfair’   -- p < .001, one-tailed). This confirms my first hypothesis: Low
contributors who extract the maximum available benefit (i.e., free riders in active
settings) are judged as acting less fairly than low contributors who automatically receive
the very same amount (i.e., free riders in passive settings.)

Hypothesis 2
I claimed that free-riders and suckers would express opposite preferences for passive vs.
active consumption. Results are in line with my hypothesis: while more participants
(58%) chose active over passive consumption when they were in the role of a sucker, this
pattern was reversed when participants were in the role of free-rider, where a majority
(61%) preferred passive to active consumption. I ran a related samples McNemar test to
check whether the responses in the two samples differ significantly from each other. The
result was significant (p < .013).
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Hypothesis 3
My main hypothesis states that participants in active settings will contribute significantly
more than those in passive settings. Because participants played a total of four rounds of
the public good game (two rounds in the active and two rounds in the passive setting, in
different order), I aggregated the first and second contribution decisions in both the active
and passive settings. Results are clearly in line with my predictions.
Paired sample t-tests comparing first decisions in active vs. passive settings show
that participants contributed significantly more to the public good in the active
consumption condition (MActive

1

= 7.02 vs. MPassive

1

= 6.05, p < .048).

Contributions in the second round of each condition also showed higher contributions in
the active consumption condition (MActive

2

= 8.20 vs. MPassive

2

= 6.97, p < .003).

Additional analyses employing repeated measures ANOVA showed no main effect of
order, and additionally confirm the results of the above analysis (for all first decisions: F
= 4.207, p < .045, for all second decisions: F = 9.817, p < .003). Together, these results
provide support for my central hypothesis: anticipating the active consumption of public
goods increases contributions to them (see Figure 5.1.)

25

Figure 5.1 Aggregated contributions in first and second decisions.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The  results  reported  above  support  my  central  ‘shadow  of  consumption’  argument:  those  
public goods which must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than
those that are passively consumed. I present several types of evidence: attitudinal data
(hypothesis 1) indicates that free riders in active settings are judged more negatively than
free riders in passive settings; reported preferences (hypothesis 2) suggest that
participants strategically chose active vs. passive consumption, depending on whether
they were in the role of a sucker or free-rider. Finally, I present actual behavioral data
(hypothesis 3): participants contributed significantly more to the public good when they
anticipated an active consumption decision than when they expected that the public good
would be automatically redistributed. This study thus provides the first evidence that
passively consumed public goods differ in important ways from those that are actively
consumed.
The current work extends research on the provision of public goods in a number
of ways. First, prior work has not addressed how anticipated consumption serves as an
independent predictor  of  collective  action.  As  a  result,  I’ve  argued,  the  standard  approach  
to the study of public goods systematically overestimates the level of free-riding that
occurs in the provision of many public goods. Second, the results suggest that the
consumption of public goods is of greater theoretical significance in explaining public
good provision (and maintenance) than research up to now has assumed. Finally, the
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results suggest that, all other things equal, public goods that must be consumed actively
will tend to be provided at higher levels than those that are passively consumed. In most
cases, whether a good is consumed actively or passively is determined solely be the
nature of the good. In other cases, however, policy makers might be able to implement an
active decision component into the public goods consumption. My results suggest that
such action would increase provision of the public good.

Directions for future studies
Before concluding, I outline several directions for future work on the shadow of
consumption  hypothesis.  First,  it  is  important  to  address  the  ‘shadow  of  consumption‘  in  
dynamic collective action groups, where participants interact over multiple rounds with
real – versus simulated others. Results from the existing study are promising in this
regard.   While   participants’   contribution   level   plummeted   sharply   when   switching   from  
active to passive consumption settings, the level of those entering the active setting (from
passive environments) remained constant and even increased (see Figure D.1, which
displays the results prior to aggregation.)
Secondly,   the   present   research   only   investigated   participants’   attitudes towards
hypothetical free-riders. As hypothesized, participants judged free riders in active settings
more harshly than those in passive environments, despite the fact that they benefited
equally. Can we expect higher levels of (costly) punishment of free-riders in activeversus passive-consumption settings?
Finally, future studies should address who is driving the surge in cooperation
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levels from passive to active settings. I suggest that analyzing the interaction of social
value orientation (Au and Kwong 2004; Balliet et al. 2009; Liebrand 1986; van Lange
1999) with contribution behavior in passive vs. active settings will be a promising
approach. Drawing on research looking at the interaction of person and situation in
prosocial behavior (Simpson and Willer 2008; Willer et al. 2013) I argue that more selfinterested actors will be most affected  by  the  ‘shadow  of  consumption.’  This  is  because  
of the increased scrutiny of actions in active active (vs. passive) consumption settings.
Already having observed that the two consumption types elicit different cooperation
levels, a future demonstration   that   “egoists”   tend   to   contribute   at   rates   more   similar   to  
“prosocials”  in  active  consumption  settings  would  be  important  as  a  key  issue  in  public  
goods research in unfairness (Schroeder et al. 2003).

Conclusion
The main point of departure for the present study was the following observation: despite
many variations on the standard design in public goods experiments, nearly all of them
share the feature of passive consumption. I suggested that the automatic distribution of
benefits design, in which each group member automatically receives his or her share of
the public good, systematically under-represents many real world public goods which
must be actively consumed.
I developed the main ‘shadow   of   consumption’ hypothesis: actively consumed
public goods are more likely to be provided, or provided at a higher level, than those that
are passively consumed. Specifically, I proposed that actors who anticipate the active
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consumption of a public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than
those who anticipate passive consumption, as is the case in the standard public goods
design used up to now. The results of a new experiment fully support my main
hypothesis: the public good was provided at significantly higher levels when participants
anticipated active consumption of the public good compared to passive consumption.
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APPENDIX A – SCOPE CONDITIONS OF THE INITIAL MODEL
1. The scope of the theory encompasses collective action situations involving the
potential production of public goods which are
1a. non-excludable and subject to joint consumption,
1b. valued by all members of the group, and
1c. require costly contributions from members of the group to be produced.
2. On any given trial, there are two distinct choices to be made by each actor, linked to
two distinct points of measurement, which are to occur in the following sequence:
2a. at t(+1): Contribution choice towards the provision of a public good, and
2b.  at  t(+2):  Consumption  choice  towards  the  consumption  of  a  public  good’s  joint  
benefits.
2c. Actors need to share a common anticipation of [2a] and [2b] to occur at outset t(0).
3a. Each actor has equal access to the same amount of a public good (jointness of
consumption), from which he/she can only benefit if the public good is actively
consumed (i.e., extracted).
3b. Each actor may or may not consume (i.e., extract) any amount from zero to the
maximum of his/her personal share of the public good in units of one.
3c. Anything not consumed (i.e., extracted) at t(+2) will not be consumable in the future.
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4a. On any given trial, a person benefits most by both withholding contributions and
extracting the maximum possible amount of personal benefit, and
4b. if all withhold contributions all will be worse off.
5. On  any  given  trial,  each  actor  can  see  each  other  actor’s  decisions.
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APPENDIX B – SIMULATED FEEDBACK OF ALTERS’ CONTRIBUTIONS
Table B.1 Simulated Feedback: alter contributions.

Decision

Individual
Alter contributions

Total
Alter contributions
(without ego)

SD

1st

8-ego-7-10-7

32

1.4

2nd

7-ego-7-9-6

29

1.3

Introduction of within manipulation
3rd

8-10-8-6-ego

32

1.6

4th

6-10-7-6-ego

29

1.9
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Table B.2 Simulated Feedback: payoff range.

Decision

Lowest-Highest
Total Contribution
(ego 0 - 10)

Lowest-Highest Possible Payoff
Total Contribution
Range
(doubled)
for ego

1st

32 - 42

64 - 84

13 - 17

2nd

29 - 39

58 - 78

12 - 16

Introduction of within manipulation
3rd

32 - 42

64 - 84

13 - 17

4th

29 - 39

58 - 78

12 - 16
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APPENDIX C – FREE RIDER QUESTIONNAIRE
The answer categories were presented on a 7-Item Likert Scale:
# 1 in Game A acted much more unfairly -- more unfairly -- slightly more unfairly
than # 1 in Game B,
# 1 in Game A and #1 in Game B acted equally unfairly,
# 1 in Game B acted slightly more unfairly-- more unfairly -- much more unfairly
than # 1 in Game A.
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APPENDIX D – MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS OVER ALL FOUR ROUNDS

Figure D.1 Mean Contributions over all four rounds.
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